C Additional Results

C.1 Utilization among Switchers
In Table C .1, we analyze the number of doctor visits as a measure of utilization of health care services.
We investigate whether there are measurable differences between switchers and nonswitchers. In case of the SHI sample, the explanatory variable of interest, switching, refers to SHI in the current and PHI in the next period, while for the PHI sample, it refers to SHI in the past and PHI in the current period. We find that the number of doctor visits is lower for switchers to PHI compared to non-switchers. The effect is significant on the 1%-level for the sample of SHI insurees and appears to be driven by men.
This result hints at some advantageous selection among switchers to PHI in terms of utilization. 
C.2 Probit specification
Additionally to the linear model of switching from one to the other insurance system, we also estimate a non-linear probit specification:
where it is normally distributed, and the notation follows the one used in the main analysis.
SwitchSHI it and SwitchSHI * it are specified accordingly.
In contrast to the linear specification, the coefficients cannot be interpreted in a straightforward way. In particular, computing and interpreting interaction effects such as treatment effects from a non-linear difference-in-differences model is non-trivial. As noted by Norton et al. (2004), the interaction effect may be non-zero even if the probit estimate of the interaction term is 0, and statistical significance of the estimate cannot be tested in a standard way.
To compute the average marginal interaction effect and corresponding standard errors, we use a stata package for logit and probit models called inteff that implements the method proposed by Norton et al. (2004) .
We report the marginal effect of the interaction term from the probit model in Table 2 in the main text and the probit estimation coefficients in Table C. 2. Table C .3 reports the exact numerical results from an analysis of whether pre-trends in switching rates differed between men and women, see Figure 4 in the main text.
C.3 Pre-Trends
C.4 Additional Sensitivity Analyses
We also examine whether our results are robust to alternative specifications of the sample, and to alternative choices of covariates. Table C .4 shows results for switching to PHI, and Table C .5 shows results for switching to SHI.
In column (1) of Table C .4 we show that results are in line with the baseline results from
Column 1 of Table 2 if we restrict the sample to individuals who, in at least one of two consecutive years, have an income strictly above the mandatory insurance threshold (rather than above 75% of the threshold), hold voluntary social insurance, or who are civil servants, self-employed or mini-jobbers. Column (2) shows results for the original sample specification of Bünnings and Tauchmann (2015), which does not include mini-jobbers. Here, the main coefficient is positive, but no longer significant.
Column (3) of Table C .4 presents results for a sample that excludes individuals with children below the age of three years. Simultaneous with the implementation of the unisex mandate there was a reform in child benefits for children up to three years. Estimation results are essentially unchanged compared with the baseline results.
In column (4) of Table C .4 we instrument health status by the less subjective measures legally attested disability status and number of hospitalization days in order to account for potential measurement error in self-assessed health (see also Grunow and Nuscheler, 2014; Bünnings and Tauchmann, 2015) . The findings are in line with the baseline results.
In columns (5) to (7) of Table C .4 we present results for alternative sets of covariates.
Results are not sensitive if we omit covariates and even when we control for nothing more than time trends. Table C .5 shows corresponding sensitivity analyses also for switching to SHI. As for the baseline results in Column (2) of Table 2 , the coefficient on F em×Implemented are negative, but insignificant. (4)). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. (2)). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
D Premiums D.1 Premiums and the Unisex Mandate
We also investigate premiums in PHI using the SOEP data set. However, as there is no detailed information on the coverage of different health plans in the SOEP, potential selection issues cannot be considered. Moreover, PHI premiums in the SOEP were not observed in the year 2013. The results in this section have to be treated with caution.
First, we regress premiums (in natural logarithm) on the gender indicator. Column (1) of (2) shows regression results when, additionally, being a civil servant is controlled for. In this case, women pay significantly higher premiums than men. The difference between the results in Column (1) and Column (2) can be explained by a higher share of women in the civil servants group, which receives subsidies and therefore pays lower premiums. Column (3) shows that even when additionally controlling for socioeconomic factors, employment and health, PHI premiums for women are significantly higher.
This corroborates women as the higher-risk group to the insurer.
To analyze the effect of the unisex mandate on premiums, we apply a similar methodology as in the main analyses:
The dependent variable premiums it refers to the PHI premiums i reports to pay in t. impl t ,
pre-treat t , and d t are period and year dummies, respectively. X it includes the set of control variables as above, as these factors likely affect prices paid in PHI. Additionally, Z it includes a dummy variable for individuals to having been privately insured prior to our observational period.
β, γ, δ, ζ, η, and θ are parameters. β captures the effect of the unisex mandate on differences in PHI premiums between women and men. β < 0 would indicate that premiums for women decreased relative to premiums for men after the unisex mandate was implemented.
Similarly as in the main analysis for switching rates, results from this estimation can only be interpreted in terms of relative differences. β < 0 does not imply that premiums have decreased for women in absolute terms.
In Table D .2, we test for pre-trends for premiums. We find that pre-trends for premiums do not significantly differ between women and men at the 5% level. Note that the year 2012 is the omitted category, and premiums are not included in the data for 2013. 
D.2 Instrumental variables estimation for the effect of premiums on switching to PHI
It is possible to interpret the ratio of estimation coefficient of the effect of the unisex mandates on differences in switching rates between women and men shown in Table 2 and the estimation coefficient of the effect of the unisex mandate on differences in premiums shown in Table 4 as an instrumental variables estimator. In this instrumental variable approach, the reform would be used as an instrument for a change in PHI premiums for women relative to men. 
E Utilization E.1 Doctor Visits
Next, we analyze the effect of the unisex mandate on health care utilization as measured by the number of doctor visits within the past three months. Number of Doctor Visits is coded using the information from the year to follow to ensure that all control variables can be treated as given. We focus on the number of doctor visits because of data availability in the SOEP.
The summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that the utilization of health care services in terms of doctor visits is higher for women than for men. In Table E .1, we show that this relationship between gender and utilization holds even after controlling for possibly confounding factors. We regress the number of doctor visits on the female indicator and control for socio-economic aspects, employment, self-assessed risk and self-assessed health.
This uses the full sample of both PHI and SHI insurees.
The results point towards a higher number of doctor visits among women, which classifies men as the lower-risk group. Column (1) of Table E .1 shows that the number of doctor visits is on average about 0.51 higher for women than for men within the past three months, all else constant. Column (2) shows that this holds also when a nonlinear poisson estimation is considered. The estimates translate into a similar average marginal increase of about 0.53 more doctor visits for women compared to men. The unisex mandate might not only affect switching behavior but might also affect the risk pool of PHI insurees. Ideally, we would observe adjustments in the menu of insurance contracts as to account for such changes in the distribution of risks. However, due to data limitations, we focus on effects that can be measured by utilization. The unisex policy might have worsened the risk pool of PHI and led to a relative increase in realized risk. To investigate this, we study the policy's effect on the utilization of health care services in both systems as measured by the number of doctor visits in the past three months.
We test the following hypothesis: The implementation of the unisex policy worsens the risk pool in PHI as measured by the utilization of health care services.
The hypothesis predicts the risk pool in PHI to deteriorate due to the unisex mandate and, as a measure of insurance risk, utilization in PHI to increase as compared to SHI.
To assess the aggregate effect of the intervention on the pool of risks, we employ a similar before/after comparison as in the switching analysis. However, instead of comparing women to men, we consider the two insurance types PHI and SHI.
We estimate the following regression model:
where the dependent variable U tilization it refers to the number of doctor visits i has in t and E[ it |P HI it , X it , d t ] = 0 is assumed. Again, exogeneity of the error term implies that common trends for the untreated outcomes need to hold. This requires that, once differences in observable characteristics are controlled for, utilization in both groups PHI and SHI evolve with the same time trends and, absent the intervention, this co-movement can be extrapolated to the implementation period.
Rejecting β = 0 indicates that enforcing the unisex policy in the PHI market affected risk segmentation between the private and the public market way as measurable by realized risk. In particular, finding β > 0 would be in line with hypothesis 3.
Analyzing how the risk pools evolve over time is based on identifying changes in the overall pool of enrollees. As explained above, overall enrollment is likely to be less responsive to regulatory changes than switching rates. The empirical setup of this analysis is less clean and presumably less conclusive than the main analysis.
We present the results of estimating equation 4 in Table E .2. The difference in utilization patterns between SHI and PHI is not affected by the unisex policy on any conventional significance level. The conclusions from this analysis might be limited because the number of doctor visits serves only as a crude measure of health care utilization. In Table E .3, we let PHI-specific dummies enter equations 4 for each year before the actual implementation period. This checks whether pre-trends in utilization between SHI and PHI were similar.
This estimation yields time-effects on utilization that are not significantly different for PHI compared to SHI and not jointly significant. inpatient claims are about the same for women and men, but total expenses are still higher for women in both SHI and PHI. Note that these analyses cannot control for socio-economic differences between individuals.
The claims data strongly suggests that women have more expensive risk profiles than men.
E.2.2 Computations
The federal insurance office reports average expenses per insurance day for each year disaggregated by health category, men and women and age for SHI.
We compute the average yearly outpatient expenses and the average yearly in- insurees for each age group is obtained by multiplying the number of insurance days by 365:
insurees a = V T a * 365, insurees a : Number of insurees in age group a V T a : Number of insurance days in age group a ("Versicherungstage").
To obtain the expenses per year for each age group, the number of insurance days is multiplied by the average costs per insurance day in each age group:
expenses a = V T a * expensesV T a , expenses a : Yearly expenses in age group a expensesV T a : Average expenses per insurance day in age group a.
Summing up the expenses in each age group and dividing them by the total number of insurees finally yields the average cost per year and person: avExpenses = (Σ a expenses a )/(Σ a insurees a ).
The BAFIN publishes average expenses for each year, disaggregated by health category, health plans, men and women and age for PHI. For civil servants, the 'Beihilfe-subsidy is ignored and the full expenses are reported.
We compute the average yearly outpatient expenses and the average yearly inpatient expenses for men and women separately, over all health plans to account for selection effects. Only individuals aged 18 or older are considered.
Expenses are computed as follows (omitting the index for gender): First, the age profiles are multiplied with the normed expenses ("Grundkopfschaden") to obtain the average yearly expense for each age group in each health plan:
expenses ah = Σ a prof ile ah * norm h , expenses ah : Average yearly expenses for age group a in health plan h prof ile ah : Normed expense for age group a in health plan h norm h : Grundkopfschaden in health plan h.
Multiplying all expenses for each health plan and age group by the number of insurees in that health plan and age group yield total yearly expenses: totExpenses = Σ a Σ h expenses ah * insurees ah insurees : Number of insurees (Bestandszahlen).
Finally, dividing by the total number of insurees gives average expenses: avExpenses = totExpenses/(Σ a Σ h insurees ah ).
